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CONFUSION IS THE KEY: A TRADEMARK
LAW ANALYSIS OF KEYWORD BANNER
ADVERTISING
Kurt M. Saunders*
"Thought is a key to all treasures....
ABSTRACT

Keyword banner advertising is a form of targeted online marketing
practice whereby a banner ad is displayed on a search engine results
page. The banner ad is triggered by the keyword used in the search.
Many search engines sell trademarks as keywords as well, allowing
competitors to purchase them as keywords for the purpose of
displaying their own advertising. Some have argued that this practice
should lead to liability for trademark infringement or dilution. Given
the realities of online marketing and the underlying policies of
trademark law, this is unlikely. Rather, this practice should be
regarded as trademark fair use and treated as a form of lawful
comparative advertising.
INTRODUCTION

Every advance in communications technology has brought new
opportunities for marketing. Whether it was the invention of the
printing press, telephone, radio, or television, advertisers have been
able to make use of each new medium to deliver information about
their products and services to consumers.
The diffusion of
information technology and access to the Internet has been
accompanied by such online marketing strategies as "pop-up"l
advertisements and spain e-mail.
Another widely used online
marketing tool is banner advertising, "which appear[s] at the top of
many commercial websites, [and] allow[s] the user to click on the ad
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and be transported directly to the home page of the advertiser, or to
other relevant content regarding an offer." 2
It was not long before banner advertising was further refined by
uniting it with search engine technology.3 Search engines-such as
Google, Yahoo!, or Altavista--allow a user to type in one or more
search terms, or "keywords," that trigger the search program
instantaneously to search the Internet for websites in which the search
term appears in the programming code.' The search engine then
compiles a list of websites that contain the user's keywords5 and posts
them in a list of search results.6 Targeted advertising is more
profitable since advertisers are willing to pay more for each ad,
knowing that it will be displayed to those consumers who are already
interested in the product or service they sell.7 Like most commercial
websites, search engines sell advertising space on their web pages,

2. Kurt M. Saunders, Practical Internet Law for Business 60 (2001). Keyword
banner advertising is an essential advertising method on the Internet. The success of
banner advertising is largely measured by the click-through rate-the percentage of
users who have viewed an ad after having clicked on it. See Ralph F. Wilson, Using
Banner Ads to Promote Your Website, Web Marketing Today, July 1, 2000, at
http://www.wilsonweb.com/articles/bannerad.htm.
3. For news about search engines, information about how search engines
operate, and tests and statistics as to how well search engines work, see Search Engine
Watch, at http://www.searchenginewatch.com (last visited October 15, 2002).
4. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir.
2000) ("The most common method of locating an unknown domain name is simply to
type in the company name or logo with the suffix .com. If this proves unsuccessful,
then Internet users turn to a device called a search engine.").
5. One court has explained this process as follows:
When a keyword is entered [into a search engine], the search engine
processes it through a self-created index of web sites to generate a
(sometimes long) list relating to the entered keyword. Each search engine
uses its own algorithm to arrange indexed materials in sequence, so the list
of web sites that any particular set of keywords will bring up may differ
depending on the search engine used.
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045
(9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Other factors also figure into the relevance formulas, including the title of the
web page, the number of visitors who come to the web page, the number of other web
pages that link to the web page, and whether the search term appears in the address
(or URL) of the web page. Some search engines also include additional factors, such
as whether a particular site or group of sites has caught the attention of some member
of the search engine company and deserves a higher ranking, or whether the website
designer paid the search engine company to appear higher in the rankings.
6. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Note, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks:
What's the Meta For?, 86 Va. L. Rev. 835, 849 (2000) ("Most search engines attempt
to rank sites by relevance, but the formula for determining relevance varies by search
engine. Relevance is primarily determined by the number of times a given search
term appears on a Web page.").
7. Targeted ads obtain higher click-through rates than random ads. See Wilson,
supra note 2 ("For example, you'd expect an ad for Wilson Tennis Racquets to get a
higher [click-through rate] on a tennis site than on a general sports site. A ...general
site such as MSNBC would get an even lower [click-through rate].").
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particularly on pages that list search results.8 These banner ads are
displayed at the top of the screen above the search results.' Most
Internet search engine sites have begun to sell "keyword banner
advertisements." Typically, a search engine displays an advertiser's
banner ads in random rotation on web pages containing the search
results. For an additional fee, however, the search engine can be
programmed to display an advertiser's banner ads whenever a user
types in one of a series of designated terms in his search.1" This allows
the advertiser to target its ads to reach a more receptive audience and

thereby maximize the effectiveness of its online advertising. 1 For
instance, Goodyear's banner ad can be triggered when a user
performs a search using the keyword "tires" as a query term.

Keyword advertising is now a staple for search engine sites,
generating a considerable portion of their revenue and allowing them
to continue providing their services for free.12 Some advertisers,
however, have taken this opportunity a step further. They have
purchased their competitors' trademarks as keywords so that their
banner ads appear on the page displaying results from a search that
used another's trademark as the query term. For example, suppose
that Goodyear, in addition to buying such keywords as "tires" and

"car," also bought the trademarks GOODRICH or FIRESTONE as
keywords. When a user conducts a search using "Goodrich" as a

keyword, Goodyear's banner ad will appear at the top of the search
results page. The reasoning here is that the user might be tempted to
click on the banner ad and be persuaded to purchase tires from
Goodyear rather than Goodrich. Of course, this practice may in fact
benefit consumers as it allows them to learn of more choices related to
their search query and learn more about alternative products. In turn,
it may also stimulate further competition among sellers, resulting in
lower prices and improved quality.13
8. See Greg Miller & Davan Maharaj, Banner Ads on the Web Spark a
Trademark Battle, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1999, at Al. Search engines sell advertising
by per impression or per click. Per impression advertising involves paying the website
owner or search engine for each time that a user views the banner ad. Per-click
advertising, which is more expensive, involves paying the website owner or search
engine for every user who clicks on the banner ad and then views the advertiser's site.
Wilson, supra note 2.
9. See Robbin Zeff & Brad Aronson, Advertising on the Internet 11 (2d ed.
1999).
10. Typically, search engines sell keywords to advertisers at a much higher rate
than non-targeted banner advertising. See Miller & Maharaj, supra note 8, at Al
(noting that the average price for a keyword advertisement is about forty dollars for
every one thousand times the ad is displayed, whereas non-targeted advertisements
are only about twenty-five dollars for every one thousand displays).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. The effectiveness of this advertising strategy lies in the fact that an advertiser
knows that if a consumer enters a competitor's trademark as a keyword, the consumer
is guaranteed to be already interested in that type of product or service. See Pui-Wing
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Nevertheless, some sellers have challenged this marketing strategy
as a threat to their trademark rights and goodwill. 14 Whether this
practice is a benefit to consumers and competition or a new form of
trademark rights violation is just one in a line of unique legal issues
emerging from the new marketplace of electronic commerce.15 As the
courts have pondered the applicability of traditional principles of
trademark law in the context of the Internet, it is easy to confound
sound legal reasoning and public policy with a misunderstanding of
the technology that gives rise to the dispute. This Article examines
the use of trademarks as keywords for banner advertising and
trademark law issues that it has generated. After a brief overview of
basic trademark law analytical concepts,16 we consider the litigation
that has challenged this marketing practice in light of fundamental
trademark law doctrine and then suggest an analysis for courts to
follow in resolving these issues.' Ultimately, this Article concludes
that keyword banner advertising is not and should not be actionable
as a trademark rights violation.' Indeed, keyword banner advertising
facilitates consumer choice and promotes competition.
I. TRADEMARK LAW AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.., used.., to identify and distinguish...
goods.., from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods."'19 Thus, a trademark serves as an indicator of
source for consumers, allowing them to associate the product with its
manufacturer.2z 1 In addition, a trademark may serve as an indicator of
Tam, Mutual Funds' Web Ads Turn Sneaky-Some U.S. Firms Buy Rights to
Keywords Including Rivals' Names, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1999, at 16 (explaining
that investment fund companies buy competitors' trademarks as keywords because
"the ads are in front of someone who [advertisers] know is interested in investing"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, buying a competitor's trademark as a
keyword can be particularly effective if the advertiser has little brand awareness
among consumers, since the ads for the little-known advertiser can appear when the
user enters a famous trademark as a search term. Wes Hills, Lexis in Court on Net
Site, Dayton Daily News, Apr. 1, 1999, at 5B (discussing the lawsuit by Lexis-Nexis
against AltaVista and Corporate Intelligence Corporation), available at 1999 WL
3958922.
14. See Mark Frauenfelder, Psst! Want to Buy a Keyword?, The Industry
Standard, Mar. 29, 1999 (discussing the lawsuit by Playboy against Netscape and
Excite and the lawsuit by Estee Lauder against Excite, Webcrawler, and Fragrance
Counter), available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,3871,00.html; see
also Hills, supra note 13.
15. See Penelope Patsuris, Invasion of the Trademark Snatchers, Forbes (Mar. 12,
1999), available at http://www.forbes.com/1999/O3/12/feat.html.
16. See infra notes 19-57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 58-151 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 152-217 and accompanying text.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
20. At least one scholar has suggested that trademarks serve not only as source
identifiers, but also as part of the good or service itself. See Alex Kozinski,
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quality, allowing consumers to associate the mark with a product's
superiority or inferiority to competing products. 21 Trademarks can
also signify sponsorship or authorization by the trademark owner.22
Trademarks are classified in the order of their increasing
distinctiveness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and
fanciful. 23 The more distinctive the mark, the greater the protection
afforded by law.24 When a mark is not inherently distinctive, it may
nevertheless be protected if it has acquired distinctiveness, also known
as "secondary meaning. "25 To determine if a primarily descriptive
mark has acquired secondary meaning, the courts consider the length
and manner of use; nature and extent of advertising and promotion;
efforts made to promote conscious connection in the public's mind
between the trademark and the business; and extent to which the
public actually identifies the mark and the product or service, as
measured by consumer surveys.2 6 If a preponderance of these factors
has led consumers to associate the mark with the product, then it has
acquired secondary meaning. 7
The Lanham Trademark Act 28 provides federal protection 29 to both

registered3" and unregistered trademarks3' used in interstate
commerce.3 2 The Lanham Act prohibits infringement and dilution,33
Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 972-73 (1993).
21. As such, they lower the costs of consumer searching by providing a reliable
signal of product quality. For an economic analysis of trademark protection, see
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1987).
22. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 3:4 (4th ed. 2001) ("For example, the name or logo of a university on clothing can
signify that the university authorizes, endorses and licenses the sale of such wearing
apparel by the manufacturer.").
23. See 2 id. § 11:2; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. See G. Peter Albert Jr., Intellectual Property Law in Cyberspace 47 (1999).
25. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 22, § 11:2-28; see also Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition §§ 13-17 (1995).
26. See Albert, supra note 24, at 54.
27. See also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir.
1983) ("The concept of secondary meaning recognizes that words with an ordinary
and primary meaning of their own may by long use with a particular product, come to
be known by the public as specifically designating that product." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Cf.15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
29. Though most states provide for their own registration of trademarks, state
registration is not an effective form of protection because trademarks used on the
Internet are transmitted through interstate and international commerce. Federal
registration of a trademark creates a presumption of validity, ownership, and the right
to use the mark, and allows the owner to prevent importation of products into the
United States that may infringe the mark.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
31. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
32. See id. §§ 1051-1127.
33. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. §
1125.
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allowing trademark owners to obtain injunctions,34 and in some cases
monetary damages,35 for the improper use of their marks. 6
Trademark rights are tied to geographic location.3 7 The actual and
possible geographic market for the product or service, and the extent
of advertising, may limit claims for the improper use of the mark, 3
and the same mark may be separately owned in different countries.3 9
A.

Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition

Pursuant to section 32 of the Lanham Act, a party will be liable for
infringement of a federally registered trademark if that party uses "in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
To establish a trademark
cause mistake, or to deceive.""
infringement claim under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant is using a mark confusingly similar to
the plaintiff's own mark. 1 In order to prevail in such a claim, the
plaintiff must show that there exists a likelihood that an appreciable
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
35. Id. § 1117.
36. Id. § 1125(a)(1) & (c).
37. See Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, World Intellectual Property
Guidebook § 5E[2][a]-[b].

38. See id. § 5E[21[c]-[d].
39. See Albert, supra note 24, at 41.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a).
41. Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act applies to federally registered marks and
provides that,
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;.., shall be
liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
Id. § 1114(1). See also Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217
(9th Cir. 1987). The same standard is set forth in section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act.
This section applies to both registered and unregistered marks in unfair competition
claims, a subject not covered in this article.
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which-(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Id. § 1125(a)(1).
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number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be confused as
to the source or sponsorship of the goods or services in question.42
The test for determining likelihood of confusion involves a weighing
of factors, including the following: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's
mark; (2) the degree of similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that
plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) defendant's good
faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product; and
(8) the sophistication of the buyers.43
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,44 for instance, Playboy sued
Frena, an operator of an electronic bulletin board service, where
subscribers often uploaded and downloaded copies of Playboy
photographs for exchange. Playboy's registered PLAYBOY and
PLAYMATE trademarks appeared on many of the images. Playboy
brought an action against Frena for trademark infringement.
Although Frena claimed that he could not regulate what his
subscribers placed on the bulletin board, the court held that this
amounted to infringement: "It is likely that customers of Defendant
Frena would believe that [Playboy] was the source of Defendant
Frena's images and that [Playboy] either sponsored, endorsed or
approved [his] use of [the] images."45
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also protects unregistered
trademarks from infringement. This section imposes liability for
unfair competition when a party "uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact," that "islikely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person."46

42. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir.
1992).
43. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979);
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); In re E.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
44. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
45. Id. at 1561.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). The tests for infringing registered and
unregistered marks are substantially the same. See Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Cycles USA,
Inc., 765 F.2d 1502, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that in a claim for unfair
competition under section 43(a), the relevant factors "are identical to the factors
relevant to establishing a likelihood of confusion with respect to trademark
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114").

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 71

Trademark Dilution

In addition to a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff may bring
an action for trademark dilution. Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act,a7 dilution refers to the decreased capacity of a famous
mark4" to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
competition between the parties or likelihood of confusion.49 Dilution
usually takes the form of "blurring" or "tarnishment."5" Blurring
occurs where consumers mistakenly associate the famous mark with
goods and services of another's mark, thereby weakening the power of
the famous mark owner to identify and distinguish its goods and
services." Examples of blurring include "DuPont" shoes, "Buick"
aspirin, and "Kodak" pianos.
By contrast, tarnishment occurs "where an accused, junior mark is
used on unwholesome or inferior goods or services that may [degrade
or] create a negative association with the goods or services protected
by the famous mark."5 2 For instance, the use of the famous trademark
CANDYLAND, a name for a popular children's board game, was
tarnished by the use of the trademark for "candyland.com" as a
domain name for a website featuring adult pornography. 3
Irrespective of whether dilution is alleged by blurring or tarnishment,
the court must determine whether a famous mark is being used in a
way that diminishes its distinctiveness or reputation in the minds of
consumers, rather than focusing on whether marks of competing
substitutes are confusingly similar. 4
To prove a claim for dilution, the plaintiff must demonstrate that

47. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
48. In determining whether a mark is "famous," a court may consider factors such
as: the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; the duration and
extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the
mark is used; the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; the
geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; the channels of
trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; the degree of recognition
of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and
the person against whom the injunction is sought; the nature and extent of use of the
same or similar marks by third parties; and whether the mark was federally registered.
See id. § 1125(c).
49. The Lanham Act defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or
absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties,
or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id. § 1127.
50. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 22, at § 24:67.
51. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 616 (E.D. Va. 1997).
52. See id. at 614; see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326
n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that tarnishment involves "improperly associat[ing]" a
plaintiff's famous mark "with an inferior or offensive product or service").
53. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480
(W.D. Wash. 1.996).
54. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 22, § 24:70.
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(1) its mark is famous; (2) defendant has made a commercial use of
the mark in commerce; (3) defendant's use began after the mark
became famous; and (4) defendant's use of the mark dilutes the
quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify
and distinguish goods and services." The owner of a famous mark is
entitled to an injunction against another person's commercial use of
the mark if that "use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."56 Monetary
damages may also be available if that person willfully intended to
trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous
mark.57
C.

Initial Interest Confusion as a Basisfor TrademarkInfringement
on the Internet

In most instances of trademark infringement, the likelihood of
confusion occurs at the time of purchase. 8 The doctrine of initial
interest confusion, however, posits that trademark infringement
results when a consumer has been confused prior to purchase. 9 A
consumer may be confused at the initial point of his or her search for
the trademark owner's product or service as a result of the
defendant's misuse of the trademark. The concern behind the
doctrine of initial interest confusion is that consumers will be misled
into taking an initial interest in the product or service of a firm that is
using another firm's trademark or one confusingly similar to it.6" The
courts have held that there is a likelihood of confusion even if it is
later corrected by examination prior to purchase and even if no sale is
made as a result of the confusion.6"
The Internet has been a fertile ground for trademark litigation, and
initial interest confusion has been the basis of several decisions
Domain names that
involving online trademark infringement.
incorporated or were confusingly similar to another's trademark were
This practice, known as
of litigation.
the first fountainhead
"cybersquatting,"6 2 resulted in initial interest confusion when the
consumer typed a domain name into his or her browser expecting to
find the plaintiff's website but was instead directed to the defendant's
55. See Panavision,141 F.3d at 1324.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
57. Id.
58. See 3 McCarthy, supra note 22, at § 23:5 (discussing and referring to this as
"point of sale confusion").
59. See 3 id. § 23:6.
60. See 3 id.
61. See 3 id.
62. See Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auth., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 496,
498 (E.D. Va. 1999) (describing cybersquatting as using "[domain name] registration
as a club to extort payment... [and constituting continuing] infringement"); see also
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233-34 (N.D. II. 1996).
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website. In adjudicating those cases, the courts applied fundamental
principles of trademark law to find infringement and dilution.63 As an
additional federal remedy for cybersquatting, Congress enacted the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA").64 The
ACPA creates a cause of action against any person who registers,
as a domain name with bad faith
traffics in, or uses another's mark
65
intent to profit from that mark.
Metatagging proved to be another front in online trademark
disputes.66 HyperText Markup Language ("HTML"), which is the
principal programming language used to create websites for display by
an Internet browser, is not visible to the viewer; rather, the text and
graphical images, and the manner in which they have been arranged
by the code, is what appears when a web page is displayed.67 Metatags
are used to designate words that are written in HTML and identifiable
to search engines.68 Search engines index certain selected key terms
appearing in the HTML version of the website document and use the
first words found in the document as an abstract to list and direct a
consumer to the sites considered relevant. 69 Thus, the website creator
can use metatags to control how the search engine will index the site
by including additional keywords to index as well as a brief
description." If a firm listed a competitor's trademark in the metatags
for its website, the firm might be able to divert consumers to its site at
the expense of its competitor.71
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine of
63. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
65. See id. The ACPA further states that "a court may order the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of
the mark," and provides that damages can be awarded for violations of the Act. Id. at
For cases applying the ACPA, see Virtual Works, Inc. v.
§ 1125(d)(1)(C).
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
defendant had an ulterior purpose in selecting the domain name because it foresaw
the ability to profit from the natural similarity to plaintiff's mark and threatened to
auction the site to the highest bidder if plaintiff did not elect to purchase it); Sporty's
Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493-94 (2d Cir. 2000) (court
observed that defendant had decided to enter into competition with the plaintiff, and
that it then registered a domain name that contained what it knew to be plaintiff's
mark).
66. For a collection of information and links on metatag cases, see Danny
at http://searchenginewatch.com/resources/
Sullivan, Meta Tag Lawsuits,
metasuits.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
67. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 55.
68. See David J. Loundy, Hidden Code Sparks High-Profile Lawsuit, Chi. Daily L.
Bull., Sept. 11. 1997, at 6.
69. See id.
70. See Saunders, supra note 2, at 57.
71. See Rachel Jane Posner, Note, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine
Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 439, 453-63
(2000); see also Meeka Jun, Meta Tags: The Case of the Invisible Infringer, 218 N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 24, 1997, at 5.
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initial interest confusion to metatagging in the case of Brookfield
Communications,Inc. v. West Coast EntertainmentCorp.7 2 Brookfield
gathered and sold information about the entertainment industry using
the federally registered mark, MOVIEBUFF, for its software.7 3 ,
Brookfield discovered that West Coast, one of the nation's largest
video rental store chains, intended to launch its new website as
moviebuff.com.74 West Coast's site was to contain a searchable
entertainment base similar to Brookfield's and would use the
MOVIEBUFF term in its metatags and domain name.75 Brookfield
76
sued and later obtained a preliminary injunction against West Coast.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order enjoining West
Coast from using or facilitating the use in any manner, including
advertising promotion, the mark MOVIEBUFF or any other term or
terms likely to cause confusion, including moviebuff.com.77 Although
West Coast had registered moviebuff.com with domain name registrar
Network Solutions before Brookfield had filed for its trademark
registration, when a user entered the term MOVIEBUFF into a
search engine, the search results included the website for West Coast
along with the website for Brookfield.7 8 Thus, the court found that
using Brookfield's trademark in the metatags of the West Coast
website was likely to result in initial interest confusion,79 and
explained how this confusion might arise using the following
metaphor:
Using another's trademark in one's meta tags is much like posting a
sign with another's trademark in front of one's store. Suppose West
Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a billboard
on a highway reading-"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit
7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is
located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull
off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West
Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway
entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer
West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue
searching
80
for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there.
The court elaborated that when the search results were displayed by
the search engine, the list would include both the Brookfield and West
Coast websites, and that the West Coast website would be indicated

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1043-44.
See id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
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by the domaiff name "westcoastvideo.com."'
Although users would
be able to find the particular website they were seeking, and
consumers would not be confused that Brookfield and West Coast
were the same company, or that Brookfield somehow sponsored West
Coast's website, there was confusion because West Coast was
intentionally diverting people to its website and benefiting from the
goodwill of Brookfield's trademark. 2 The court added, however, that
if a website had merely referred to Brookfield's products or compared
its goods to a competitor's, the website's inclusion of the competitor's
trademark in its metatags would constitute fair use of the
MOVIEBUFF trademark."

Trademark suits involving metatagging have continued to appear on
court dockets, 4 even as some commentators continue to debate the
merits of the initial interest confusion analysis in such actions. 5 As
the court in Brookfield suggested, a firm may fairly use a competitor's
mark without facing liability if it is used not as a trademark, but
instead to describe in good faith one's goods or services.8 6 Fair use
permits businesses to use a protected mark to describe aspects of their
own goods.8 7 Additionally, the Act permits use of another's famous

mark in comparative advertising to identify the competing goods or

81. Id. at 1062.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1065. The court also noted that West Coast could also use the term
MOVIE BUFF in its metatags, as long as it contained a space, since this is a
descriptive term that means "motion picture enthusiast." Id. at t066.
84. See, e.g., Trans Union L.L.C. v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(N.D. I11.
2001); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); N.Y. State
Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
85. See, e.g., Veronica Tucci, The Case of the Invisible Infringer: Metatags,
Trademark Infringement and False Designation of Origin, 5 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 2
(2000); Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don't Confuse Metatags with Initial Interest
Confusion, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1349 (2002).
86. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066. The Lanham Act describes this defense to
infringement as follows:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own
business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of
a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic
origin ....
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
87. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73 (2d
Cir. 1999) (quotation and citation omitted).
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services of the famous mark's owner. 8 The fair use privilege played a
critical role in the case of Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Welles. 9
In Welles, former Playboy Playmate of the Year Terri Welles
established a website which contained photographs of herself and
other information.9" The website included the heading, "Playmate of
the Year 1981" on the masthead of the website, as well as the terms
"Playmate" and "Playboy" as metatags. 91 Welles also included a
disclaimer on the website that read: "This site is neither endorsed, nor
sponsored, nor affiliated with Playboy Enterprises, Inc. PLAYBOY®
PLAYMATE OF THE YEAR® AND PLAYMATE OF THE
MONTH® are registered trademarks of Playboy Enterprises, Inc." 92
She had further used the abbreviation "PMOY '81" repeatedly in the
wallpaper of her site.93
Playboy sued Welles for trademark infringement and dilution and
sought to enjoin her from using its trademarks in her website
masthead, banner advertising, and metatags. 94 The district court,
however, ruled that Welles's use of Playboy's trademarks in the
masthead and banner advertisements was nominative fair use 95 and
not infringing. 96 The Ninth Circuit agreed on appeal:
When Welles refers to her title, she is in effect referring to a product
of [Playboy]'s. She does not dilute the title by truthfully identifying
herself as its one-time recipient any more than Michael Jordan
would dilute the name "Chicago Bulls" by referring to himself as a
former member of that team, or the two-time winner of an Academy
Award would dilute the award by referring to him or herself as a
"two-time Academy Award winner." Awards are not diminished or
diluted by the fact that they have been awarded in the past.
Similarly, they are not diminished or diluted when past recipients

88. The following is not actionable under the Lanham Act: "(A) Fair use of a
famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion
to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark. (B)
Noncommercial use of a mark. (C) All forms of news reporting and news
commentary." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
89. 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
90. Id. at 799.
91. Id. at 800.
92. Id. at 799-80 n.1.
93. Id. at 800.
94. See id.
95. A use is a permitted nominative fair use if it meets three requirements: "First,
the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of
the trademark; Second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder." New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d
1139, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 2002).
96. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104-05 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
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truthfully identify themselves as such. It is in the nature of honors
97
and awards to be identified with the people who receive them.
As to the metatags, the court stated,
Forcing Welles and others to use absurd turns of phrase in their
metatags, such as those necessary to identify Welles, would be
particularly damaging in the internet search context. Searchers
would have a much more difficult time locating relevant websites if
they could do so only by correctly guessing the long phrases
necessary to substitute for trademarks.... Similarly, someone
searching for critiques of Playboy on the internet would have a
difficult time if internet
sites could not list the object of their critique
98
in their metatags.
Regarding Welles's repeated use of the abbreviation "PMOY '81"
in the wallpaper of her website, the court held that this was not a
nominative fair use in that it was not necessary to describe Welles
given the court's determination that she could use the mark "Playboy
Playmate of the Year" on her site. 99
Nominative fair use and initial interest confusion were at the center
of the court's ruling in J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kasse1""' as well. In this
case, J.K. Harris and Kassel directly competed in negotiating
reductions in tax assessments and favorable resolution of past due tax
obligations for clients." 1
Both parties promoted their services
online." 2 On its website, taxes.com, Kassel began publishing negative
information about Harris on a page that was designed so as to be
prominently featured in the search engine results of those seeking
information about Harris." 3 Kassel did this by creating "keyword
density" on the page in question: Harris's trade name was used
seventy-five times, header and underline tags were placed around
sentences containing Harris's trade name, the font size was increased,
and links to websites containing information about Harris were
included."'
In various searches for Harris's trade name, Kassel's site was
prominently featured in the results." 5 Harris sued to enjoin Kassel
from using its trade name anywhere on the taxes.com site, arguing
that Kassel caused initial interest confusion by attracting customers to
Kassel's site, where, after reading the negative information posted
97. Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 806.
98. Id. at 803-04.
99. Id. at 804.
100. 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2002).
101. Id. at 1927.
102. Id. at 1928.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1928, 1931.
105. See id. at 1928. On one of those searches, Kassel's site was the first site listed,
and on most others, Kassel's site was among the top ten sites identified in search
engine results. See id.
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there about Harris, they might be dissuaded from doing business with
Harris." 6 The court held that Kassel's use of Harris's trade name
would be permitted if it was a nominative fair use. 7 Further, the
court found that Harris's service could not be adequately described
without using the "J.K. Harris" trade name, but that, given the
negative nature of the information posted on Kassel's site, no user
would believe it was sponsored or endorsed by Harris."°8
Nevertheless, the court also held that it was necessary that "only so
much of the mark or marks [may] be used as is reasonably necessary
to identify the [mark holder's] product or services."'0 9 After reviewing
Kassel's uses, the court held that "[d]efendants' use of [p]laintiff's
trade name in links to other web pages and when disseminating
truthful factual information [about plaintiff] is [a] nominative fair
use."110 However, the court explained that it was not necessary to use
header or underline tags around sentences containing Harris's trade
name, to increase the font size or page prominence of sentences
containing Harris's trade name, or to weight the keyword density of
its page by using Harris's trade name, or variations thereof, seventyfive times on its web page in order reasonably to identify Harris."
Finding that there was no nominative fair use defense, the court
held that Harris was likely to prevail on its initial interest confusion
claim as consumers were likely to be confused by Kassel's use of
Harris's trade name.1 12 As a result, because irreparable harm is
presumed under the Lanham Act after a demonstration of likelihood
of confusion, the court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining
Kassel from "using 'J.K. Harris' or any permutation thereof as a
keyword for the taxes.com website more often than is necessary to
identify the content of the website;"1 3 from using header and
underline tags around sentences containing Harris's trade name, or
from increasing the prominence and font size of sentences which
include Harris's trade name. 4
106. See id. at 1929-30.
107. Id. at 1931.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1931 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d
302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1935.
114. Id. The court also enjoined defendants from continuing to post on their
website certain designated statements plaintiff claimed were false or misleading, but
refused to issue a blanket injunction enjoining defendants from posting any
defamatory, untrue or misleading statements on the taxes.com site. See id. In so
holding, the court noted that "false or misleading commercial speech may be
prohibited entirely." Id. at 1932. However, the appropriate balance between the
Lanham Act (which prohibits use of a mark in false and misleading statements) and
First Amendment concerns is to enjoin only those commercial statements which are
found to be false and deceptive. See id. at 1933; see also Steven Bonisteel, Court Order
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II. TRADEMARK LAW APPLIED TO KEYWORD BANNER
ADVERTISING

Whether keyword banner advertising results in trademark dilution
or creates a likelihood of confusion that leads to infringement are
issues that several federal courts have confronted. Two of the earliest
cases were settled without adjudication. In Estee Lauder Inc. v.
Fragrance Counter, Inc.," 5 Estee Lauder sued Excite and The
Fragrance Counter in a case involving both metatags and keyword
banner advertising. Estee Lauder objected to Excite's agreement to
highlight advertisements for The Fragrance Counter, Inc. (later
known as "iBeauty") whenever Internet users search for its
trademarks ESTEE LAUDER, ORIGINS, and CLINIQUE.
Subsequently, the parties settled the case when iBeauty agreed to
refrain from using the Estee Lauder trademarks." 6
Similarly, in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Innovator Corp.,"7 Reed Elsevier,
which owns the LEXIS, NEXIS, and LEXIS-NEXIS trademarks,
brought a trademark infringement suit against Innovator, a competing
information retrieval system, Altavista, a search engine and portal
site, and DoubleClick, a service that assists firms with the placement
of advertising on websites and search engines.' 18 Reed Elsevier sought
damages and injunctive relief due to Altavista's sale of LEXIS,
NEXIS, and LEXIS-NEXIS as keywords to its competitors. 9 Reed
Elsevier ended the case by entering into settlement agreements with
Altavista and DoubleClick. 2 '
The first case in which a court was able to adjudicate the issue of
whether keyword banner advertising results in trademark dilution or
creates a likelihood of confusion that leads to liability for
infringement
was
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Netscape
Communications Corp.2 ' In this case, Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
sought a preliminary injunction against two search engines operated
by Netscape Communications Corp. and Excite, Inc. to challenge
Netscape's keying of advertisements on its search engines to the terms
Curbs Site's Ranking in Search Results, BizReport (Apr. 11, 2002),
at
http://www.bizreport.com/print.php?art-id=3267; Shannon Lafferty, Ruling Expands
Web TrademarkProtections (Apr. 10, 2002), at http://www.law.com.
115. 189 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
116. See Carl S. Kaplan, Playboy Ruling Recognizes Limits to Online Rights of
Trademark
Holders, N.Y.
Times,
Sept.
15,
2000,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/15/technology/15CYBERLAW.html.
Estee Lauder
also filed a similar action in Germany, and in February 2000, a court in Hamburg
granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting any use of Estee Lauder's trademarks for
keyword advertising or in iBeauty's advertisements. See Excite, iBeauty Lose Key
Name Use Lawsuit, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/145545.html.
117. 105 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
118. Id. at 817.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 818.
121. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), affd 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).
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"playboy" and "playmate," which are Playboy's registered
trademarks. 122 As a result of a search using one or more of these
terms, users were provided not only with a list of websites that
contained the word "playboy" or "playmate," but also with a paid
2
banner advertisement from a seller of adult entertainment services.1 1
Although the banner ads did not contain either the word "playboy" or
"playmate," Playboy argued that this practice constituted trademark
24
infringement and dilution.
Playboy's infringement claim was based on the initial interest
confusion theory applied in Brookfield,125 but here the court
determined that Playboy's claims failed because Playboy did not show
that consumers were likely to be confused by Netscape's use of
Playboy's mark. 126 Playboy had offered no evidence indicating that
consumers believed that the banner advertisements displayed when
they conducted their search for the term "playboy" or "playmate"
were affiliated with or endorsed by Playboy. 21 Unlike the parties in
Brookfield, Playboy and Netscape did not compete in the same
market.'28 Extending the road sign metaphor in Brookfield, the court
explained,
Here, the analogy is quite unlike that of a devious placement of a
road sign bearing false information. This case presents a scenario
more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in response to a sign
that reads "Fast Food Burgers" to find a well-known fast food
burger restaurant, next to which stands a billboard that reads:
"Better Burgers: 1 Block Further." The driver, previously enticed
by the prospect of a burger from the well-known restaurant, now
decides she wants to explore other burger options. Assuming that
the same entity owns the land on which both the burger restaurant
and the competitor's billboard stand, should that entity be liable to
That is the rule
the burger restaurant for diverting the driver?
29
[Playboy] contends the Court should adopt.
The court also noted that the results produced in response to the
search contained not only a banner ad but links to Playboy's websites
as well. 3 ° Moreover, the court expressed concern that a finding of
infringement might result in the loss of otherwise generic words from
the English language at the expense of competitor need. 3' In so
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 1072.
Id.
Id. at 1072-73.
See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
Id. at 1074-75

128. Id.
129. Id. at 1075.
130. Id. at 1078.
131. See id. at 1074 (emphasizing that the words "playboy" and "playmate" are
words in the English language and their use "cannot be said to suggest sponsorship or
endorsement of either the websites that appear as search results (as in Brookfield) or
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doing, the court held that Netscape's use of "playboy" and "playmate"
as keywords was a permissible fair use of Playboy's marks and was
protected by the First Amendment:
It is... undisputed that the words "playboy" and "playmate" are
English words in their own right, and that there exist other
trademarks on the words wholly unrelated to [Playboy]. Thus,
whether the user is looking for goods and services covered by
[Playboy]'s trademarks or something altogether unrelated to
[Playboy] is anybody's guess....

...
Here, [Playboy] is seeking to leverage its trademarks "Playboy
and "Playmate ®" (which cannot be searched on the Internet)
into a monopoly on the words "playboy" and "playmate." Indeed,
by seeking a prohibition on all advertisements that appear in
response to the search words "playboy" and "playmate," [Playboy]
would effectively monopolize the use of these words on the Internet.
This violates the First Amendment rights of (a) Excite and
Netscape; (b) other trademark holders of "playboy" and "playmate";
as well as (c) members of the public who conduct Internet
searches.132
®"

Likewise, the court refused to find that Netscape had diluted
Playboy's trademarks by either blurring or tarnishment.133 Playboy
had not proved blurring of its marks because Netscape did not use the
words as trademarks and because Playboy did not demonstrate that
the use of the keywords and the banner ads in any way affected the
capacity of the marks to identify and distinguish Playboy's goods and
services.13 1 Similarly, even though the banner ads contained sexuallyexplicit adult content, there was no tarnishment because Playboy's
trademarks were also associated with adult entertainment.13 5
Accordingly, the court denied Playboy's motion for a preliminary
injunction.'36
the banner ads that adorn the search results page"). Recall that in Brookfield, the
word MOVIEBUFF was not an English language word and that while the defendant
could use the term MOVIE BUFF as a term that equates to motion picture
enthusiast, MOVIEBUFF as one word is not a word in the English language and
referred only to the plaintiff's products. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.). The Playboy v. Netscape court also drew
this distinction. See id. at 1074-75.
132. See Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp. at 1073, 1085. The court's reasoning that
these terms are generic is curious. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the trademark law conception of genericness, see Jerre B. Swann,
Genericism Rationalized,89 Trademark Rep. 639 (1999).
133. Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp at 1075-76.
134. See id. at 1075.
135. See id. at 1075-76.
136. Id. at 1076. The decision in Playboy v. Netscape prompted some to predict
that "search engines may be free to demand that trademark holders pay a fee to
prevent competitors from using the brand as a keyword." John Roemer, Judge to
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Although not a case involving banner advertising, one of the most
recent decisions concerning trademarks and keywords was Nissan
Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.137 Here, the search engine
keyword employed by the defendant was identical to an Internet
domain name that also incorporated a trademark.'38 Nissan Motor
Co., the Japanese automaker, owned since 1959 various registered
trademarks using the word NISSAN in connection with automobiles
and other vehicles, while its U.S. subsidiary, Nissan North America,
operated a website at "www.nissan-usa.com."' 3 9 The defendant,
Nissan Computer, was founded in 1991 by Uzi Nissan. 4 ° In the mid1990's, the defendant registered a trademark for its logo and the
Internet domain names "www.nissan.com" and "www.nissan.net" for
its websites' 4 1
In August 1999, the defendant altered the content of its
"www.nissan.com"
website. 142
The website was captioned
"www.nissan.com," and displayed a logo that was allegedly
confusingly similar to the plaintiff's NISSAN logo."' In addition, the
website displayed banner advertisements and hyperlinks to various
Internet search engines and merchandising companies, such as
"www.cartrackers.com" and "www.lStopAuto.com," as well as links
to other auto-related websites' 44 After talks between the plaintiff and
defendant regarding the possible transfer of the "www.nissan.com"
domain name failed, the plaintiff filed suit for trademark dilution and
infringement, domain name piracy, and unfair competition. 145 The
defendant sought leave to amend in order to file counterclaims against
Nissan Motor alleging that it had wrongfully purchased various search
terms, such as "Nissan" and "nissan.com," from various Internet
search engine operators, that, when typed into the search engines,
Trademark Holders: Online Rights Have Limits, The Industry Standard, Sept. 21,
2000, available at http://www.jmbm.com/new/new2000296150338.html. In hindsight,
such fears were premature. Indeed, such an outcome would have hearkened back to
the days of cybersquatting, when domain names were held hostage for ransom. See,
e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998).
137. 204 F.R.D. 460 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
138. Id. at 461.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. At least one other court has addressed a practice very similar to this. In
Nettis EnvtL Ltd. v. IWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722 (N.D. Ohio 1999), the defendant had
used the plaintiff's NET71S trademark in metatags and had registered "Nettis" as a
keyword with 380 search engines and portals. Id. at 724. When a website owner
registers a list of keywords associated with his or her website, the addition of the
website to the search engine or portal's database makes the website more accessible
and easier to find. In this case, the court ordered the removal of these terms from the
metatags and as database keywords. See id. at 725.
142. Nissan, 204 F.R.D. at 461.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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result in confusion and the searcher
being directed to the plaintiff's
1 46
website, rather than the defendant's.
The court first determined that the plaintiff had a legitimate right to
the term "nissan.com" as it had to the term "Nissan" and that as a
matter of law it could not be liable for using a term in which it had
trademark rights. 147 Next, the court observed that while the type of
protection afforded in cases involving cybersquatting and metatagging
might be applicable to the use of a domain name as a keyword, it was
inappropriate in this case:
There appears to be no good cause for not extending these
protections and limitations to cases where one infringes or dilutes
another's mark by purchasing a search term-as opposed to using
another's mark in one's metatags-for the purpose of manipulating
a search engine's results list. This is not such a case, however,
because the plaintiffs cannot infringe upon or dilute their own
mark-much less, one in which they have a valid, protectable
interest.148
The court also rejected the defendant's attempt to analogize the
plaintiff's purchase of the search term "nissan.com" with "paying the
occupant of the information booth at the airport to direct people to
the United Airlines counter whenever anyone should inquire where
the Starbuck's coffee counter is located. ' 149 In this case, the court
stated that a consumer who is seeking Nissan Computer's website and
who types "nissan.com" into the search engine already knows the
location of the defendant's website: "Typing 'nissan.com' into a search
engine to obtain the domain name for 'nissan.com' is as pointless...
'as telephoning a business and asking for its telephone number."" 5
As such, the defendant had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted and the court denied its motion to amend. 5 '
III. TRADEMARKS AND BANNER ADVERTISING REVISITED -THE
WORDS HOLD THE KEY

The court in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp. pointed out that "[t]he Internet is a unique and wholly new
146. Id. at 462-63.
147. See id. at 466 ("Because this Court has already found that 'the plaintiffs have a
valid, protectable trademark interest in the "Nissan" mark,' the defendant's
registration of the Internet domain names 'nissan.com' and 'nissan.net' cannot trump
the plaintiffs' use of the 'Nissan' mark on the Internet or anywhere else." (citation
omitted)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 468. For an analysis of the use of the domain name system as a search
engine and directory, see Ben Edelman, DNS as a Search Engine: A Quantitative
Evaluation (2002), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/dns-assearch.
150. Nissan, 204 F.R.D. at 468 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 463.
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medium of worldwide human communication" and courts should be
"mindful of the difficulty of applying well-established doctrines to ...
[electronic] commerce. 152 As with many areas of law that have had to

be adapted to the online context, courts must consider carefully
whether an activity or business practice is likely to cause confusion or
dilute another's trademark rights in light of consumer expectations
and sophistication.
Yet, the court's analysis in this case was
remarkably simplistic in view of its own admonition. Indeed, the
holding in Playboy v. Netscape may be limited to some extent by its
facts. Further, Playboy sued only the search engines rather than the
firms that were using the trademarks to trigger their own
advertising,153 as the plaintiffs in the Estee Lauder and Reed Elsevier
cases had done. 54
In addition, the court in Playboy v. Netscape maintained that the
trademarks involved were also generic terms 55 in the English
language,156 hinting that if the keywords were solely an inherently
distinctive or famous trademark, the outcome may have been
different. 57 For instance, under this court's reasoning, Estee Lauder's
suit against The Fragrance Counter 5 " may have led to a different
result on the grounds that "Estee Lauder" is not an English word or
generic term. 59 Similarly, Reed Elsevier might have prevailed since
"Lexis" and "Nexis" are neither generic, merely descriptive, nor
ordinary English language terms.' 6° However, the court's reasoning is
specious because PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE are not considered
generic or merely descriptive marks in the United States and most
other countries. 6' It is one thing to say that a playboy is "a typically
young and wealthy man who lives a frivolous indolent life devoted
152. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Indeed, the court relied on the fact that Playboy did not compete with the
search engines. See id. at 1074-75.
154. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
155. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("A
generic term is one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a
species. Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may be canceled at
any time on the grounds that it has become generic." (citation omitted)).
156. See Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1074-75; Matthew A. Kaminer, The
Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Trademark Keyword Banners, 16 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 35, 45 (1999).
157. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
159. See Beth I.Z. Boland et al., "Initial Interest Confusion" and the Use of
Metatags and Keyed Banner Ads in Internet Trademark Law, 45 Boston Bar J., Oct.
2001, at 6, 21 ("[T]he use of trademarked key words that are not also English words,
such as 'AOL,' 'Exxon,' or 'Bose,' could produce a different result.").
160. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
161. Cf Playboy Enters. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. A 97-734-A, 1998 WL
724000, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label,
985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry
Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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chiefly to the pursuit of pleasure,"16 2 but quite another to say that
every adult entertainment product is a "playboy."
Nevertheless, in all likelihood, the firms that had purchased
"playboy" and "playmate" as keywords knew they were trademarks,
and purchased them because they had significance as well-known
identifiers and because they hoped to maximize the exposure of their
products to those who were already searching for similar products
made by Playboy. Although the court offered that several other firms
own trademarks incorporating the word "playboy," only Playboy's use
of "playboy" involves adult entertainment.'63 Moreover, users quite
likely were seeking Playboy's products and services when they entered
the words as search terms, and thus were using the words as
trademarks.'6 4 This is also likely to have been the case with the
defendants, Netscape and Excite, which clearly appeared to be using
the terms as trademarks by selling the keywords to firms that
165
advertised and sold adult entertainment products and services.
Consequently, the court's conclusion that the Internet users and
defendants in this case were not using the words here as trademarks is
questionable at best.
A. Infringement and the Unlikelihood of Confusion
Although it is probable that the firms that had purchased the
keywords "playboy" and "playmate" had done so because they were
trademarks, if keyword banner advertising is to amount to trademark
infringement, it will be necessary to prove some form of consumer
confusion. 16 6 In this situation, point of sale confusion is unlikely
because users will quickly realize that the website is not that of the
firm whose trademark they entered as a search term once they click67
on the banner ad and are taken to the advertiser's site.
Furthermore, consumers are unlikely to make a purchase believing
that the trademark owner is affiliated with or has endorsed or
sponsored the banner advertiser, especially if the advertiser is a
competitor.

162. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1737 (3d ed. 1986).
163. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (referring to the use of "playboy" for fresh yams, sweet
potatoes, handkerchiefs, soft drinks, and carbonated water).
164. See id. at 1073.
165. See Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic Billboards Along the Information
Superhighway: Liability Under the Lanham Act For Using Trademarks to Key Internet
Banner Ads, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 847, 880 (2000) (arguing that if a search engine used the
word "apple" to key ads to computer products, this would constitute use of the Apple
Computer's trademark, but if the word "apple" was used to key ads for an apple
orchard or a fruit growers association, this would be use as a descriptive term for a
type of fruit).
166. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
167. See Kaminer, supra note 156, at 50.
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By contrast, a clear case of confusion exists if the competitor's
banner ad actually uses the trademark, or a similar mark or trade
name to trick consumers into thinking that the trademark owner is the
source or sponsor of the ad. For instance, if a consumer in search of
information about CLOROX brand bleach entered "Clorox" as a
search term and a banner ad appeared that read: "Click here for
Clorox." If the consumer clicked on the banner ad, and instead was
taken to the website for PUREX bleach, there would be a clear case
of initial interest confusion. Likewise, the same conclusion would
likely follow if a consumer in search of NIKE athletic shoes types in
"Nike" as a search term and a banner ad placed by REEBOK that
reads "Just do it!" appears.
Under these circumstances, there is less doubt that the banner
advertiser has improperly appropriated another's trademark and that
infringement has occurred. It is hard to imagine that many advertisers
would engage in such an obviously unlawful advertising practice.
However, there is also an argument to be made that even if another's
trademark is not used, an unwitting consumer might be confused by
intentionally ambiguous or misleading ad content. For example,
suppose that a consumer enters "Godiva" as the search term for
GODIVA chocolate, and in response there appears a banner ad
placed by HERSHEY that merely states: "For the richest chocolate
you've ever tasted, click here" or "Click here to order a free sample of
our chocolate!" Consumers may be tempted to click on such a banner
ad if it appears that it could be relevant to their query. 6 ' In this
manner, a consumer who originally intended specifically to access the
GODIVA website may be drawn away unwittingly to the HERSHEY
website by the unauthorized use of the GODIVA trademark as a
trigger for the banner ad.'6 9

Alternatively, the Brookfield and J.K. Harris cases suggest that a
trademark owner might resort to an infringement theory based on
initial interest confusion. 7 ' Under this line of argument, a trademark
owner could assert that a consumer in search of its product or service
would enter its trademark as a query and that the search engine would
then generate a list of search results above which appears a banner ad.
The consumer would either become confused at that point and,
thinking that the banner ad was connected with the trademark owner
or tempted by a banner ad that the consumer assumes was triggered
by the search term, click on the banner ad and be taken to the
168. See Neil Barrett, Advertising on the Internet 58 (1997) (stating that the words
"Click here!" can increase the effectiveness of a banner ad); Zeff & Aronson, supra
note 9, at 44 (suggesting that banner ads are more effective if they have a call to
action, such as "free" or "click here" and create a sense of urgency).
169. See Vivian L. Polak et al., The Legal Risks of Trademarks as Internet Search
Terms, The Internet Law Journal (Aug. 1, 2000), at http://tilj.com/content/
ipartice0801000l1 .htm.
170. See supra notes 72-83 & 100-14 and accompanying text.
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competitor's website where the consumer would find and purchase a
comparable product or service. In this way, as Playboy argued in
Playboy v. Netscape,' consumers are diverted away from the
trademark owner's products or services by the keyword banner
advertising.
The analogy to Brookfield is that with both metatags and banner
ads, the trademarks are invisible to the consumer, except to the extent
that a consumer enters them into the search engine as search terms.
Both the search results returned and the banner ads triggered are
related to the terms entered. In both instances, the primary purpose
of using the trademark is to draw the attention of consumers and
reroute them from their intended destination to the competitor's
website1 73 Sometimes the banner ads displayed in response to a
search query are actually those of the trademark owner. Just as some
of the websites in the search results are related to the query while
others are irrelevant, some of the banner ads displayed are directly
related to the trademark while others are not. Consumers may be
more receptive to banner advertising when they are actually looking
to purchase a product or seriously seeking information about a
product or service they plan to purchase. Therefore, they may pay
closer attention to banner ads to find relevant products and
information just as they would pay attention to search results. 74 If so,
initial interest confusion can be seen to be at the root of both
metatagging and keyword banner advertising. Nevertheless, it would
be hard to deny that any confusion as to source would be dispelled
where the advertiser displays its own trademark and there is a clear
indication of the source of the ad.
The analogy to Brookfield and metatagging, however, is
distinguishable from keyword banner advertising.175 Metatagging
causes a competitor's website to appear among the search results;
thus, consumers are likely to be confused. On the other hand,
keyword banner ads appear on the top of the page above the search
results and are therefore unlikely to cause this type of confusion. 76
171. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
172. See Erik T. Anderson, Protection of Trademarks from Use in Internet
Advertising Banner Triggers: Playboy v. Netscape, 40 Jurimetrics J. 469, 474 (2000).
173. See Kaminer, supra note 156, at 51.
174. Such a conclusion is consistent with Brookfield, in which the court found
confusion even where the links to competitors' websites that appear due to
metatagging were clearly identified. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the search results will
include the websites for both the trademark owner and the competitor so that when
the user looks at the search results the "user will often be able to find the particular
web site he is seeking").
175. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 156, at 53 (highlighting differences between
metatagging and keyword banner advertising); see also Posner, supra note 71, at 491
(same).
176. See Kaminer, supra note 156, at 53; Posner, supra note 71, at 491.
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Most important, consumers are more likely to ignore banner
advertisements than they would search results.
Absent plain
suggestion to the contrary, consumers typically expect that a banner
ad at the top of a webpage of search results is irrelevant to the
trademark entered as the search query. Indeed, most Internet
consumers do not even suppose that all or even most of the results
listed will match or be related to their query, expecting that many of
the links are unrelated or of no use at all.177 With respect to banner
ads, users are even more likely to presume that the ad is not that of
the trademark owner and, as a result, there is no consumer
confusion. 78
Additionally, the level of consumer sophistication plays a key role
in assessing the likelihood of confusion.17 9 Courts consider the level of
consumer sophistication, particularly those consumers who exercise
considerable attention and inspect closely, in assessing the likelihood
of confusion.18 ° Internet consumers know how critically to evaluate
and sort through search engine results.18' In fact, many online
consumers have developed "banner blindness" in reaction to the
deluge of online advertising.182 As such, it is especially unlikely that a
consumer would click on a banner ad thinking it was one of the search
177. See Dunaevsky, supra note 85, at 1383-84.
178. See Parker H. Bagley & Paul D. Ackerman, Trigger Happy: The Latest
Internet Assault on Trademarks Rights, Computer Lawyer, May 1999, at 3 (stating that
"using a keyword to trigger banner advertising presents the use of a trademark in a
manner that is not directly in connection with the goods and services being sold," and
thus the mere display of an advertisement in response to the entry of the trademark as
a search term may not lead to consumer confusion).
179. See generally Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 20-23 (1995).
The standard is that of a "typical buyer exercising ordinary caution." Homeowners
Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1111 (6th Cir. 1991).
180. See Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir.
1991). Though not required, evidence of actual confusion is also highly persuasive.
World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir.
1971).
181. Julie A. Rajzer, Comment, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts are
Overprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags, 2001 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 427, 463.
Rajzer stated,
Many Internet users have learned how to look critically through search
engine result lists to find exactly what they are looking for and weed out
unwanted and irrelevant results. Therefore, it should come as no surprise
that Internet users have gained a higher level of sophistication about the
Internet and can usually determine, on their own, the source or validity of
material on web pages.
Id.
182. "Banner blindness" is the tendency of Internet users to ignore banner
advertisements, even when the ads contain information that the users may be actively
seeking. See Magnus Pagendarm & Heike Schaumburg, Why Are Users BannerBlind? The Impact of Navigation Style on the Perception of Web Banners, J. Digital
Info. (2001), available at http://jodi.ecs.soton.ac.uk/Articles/v02/iO1/Pagendarm/; Jan
Panero Benway & David M. Lane, Banner Blindness: Web Searchers Often Miss
"Obvious" Links, Internetworking (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.internettg.org/
newsletter/dec98/banner blindness.htm.
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results or the link to the trademark owner's website.183 Furthermore,
banner ads are usually clearly marked as those of the competitor,
thereby dispelling any likely association consumers might make.
Some consumers may even use trademarks as shorthand search terms
to find sellers in the general product category, particularly when they
cannot describe the product in generic search terms in order to
generate a productive search. If so, banner ads of competitors may be
advantageous for competition, if not also desirable by the consumer.
An even sharper contrast can be made by comparing keyword
banner advertising with keyword featured placement advertising.
Keyword sales that result in "featured placements" in a search engine
results list raise greater concerns about infringement than keyword
banner ads. With this type of advertising, the search engine sells
search terms, including trademarks, as a means for advertisers to
8
move the links to their websites to the top of the results list. '
Featured placements in search engine listings appear as search result
listings of Internet websites relevant to the search. The higher the
price paid for a featured placement, the higher it will appear in the
list.'
While banner ads will appear at the top of the webpage as a
form of advertising, a featured placement listing appears in the search
results as a link that may be seen as relevant to the user's search
query. For instance, a consumer who searches for "Hertz" rental cars
may well be confused if the featured placement link listed at the
beginning of the listings is "The Best Rental Car Deal" but turns out
to be a link to the website for "Avis" rental cars. Because consumers
inexorably pay more attention to listings on the first search results
page, given the impracticality of reviewing potentially countless search
results generated by a search, keyword featured placement listings are
more likely directly to result in initial interest confusion than keyword
banner advertising.
The concern here is with what we might call "search result
density" -that consumers may become frustrated scanning page after
page of search results to find the site that they really wanted, so if the
first listing was for the same though competing product, the consumer
might decide to purchase it as an acceptable substitute. Indeed,
featured placement advertisements have been challenged as being
inherently deceptive because they may lead consumers to believe that
the search results are based on relevancy alone. 18 6 One firm has
183. See Kaminer, supra note 156, at 53.
184. The Internet Sells its Soul, The Economist, Apr. 20, 2002, at 65 (noting that
Internet search terms are up for sale as a way for advertisers "to push their sites up to
the top of search-engine listings").
185. See id. at 66 (referring to AOL, Yahoo, Altavista, and Google as examples and
stating that "[m]any search-engine sites are now auctioning such search terms. The
more companies are prepared to pay, the higher their websites will appear in the
results").
186. See Commercial Alert, Commercial Alert Files Complaint Against Search
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already brought suit for trademark infringement and unfair
competition against several search engines that employ this practice.187
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has directed Internet
search engines to ensure that "any paid ranking search results are
distinguished1 88from non-paid results with clear and conspicuous
disclosures.'
B. The Improbability of Dilution
If infringement is an unlikely source of relief against keyword
banner advertising, might the trademark owner consider a dilution
claim, which does not require a likelihood of confusion? Dilution is
limited to claims involving famous marks used by a defendant in
commerce in a manner that lessens the capacity of the mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services. 9 Moreover, dilution does
not prohibit any use of the mark; rather, it prevents only use of the
mark that results in its blurring or tarnishment.' 9°
Recall that the court in Playboy v. Netscape rejected Playboy's
dilution claim, finding that neither blurring nor tarnishment of its
trademarks had occurred.19" ' The court held that Playboy had not
proved blurring of its marks because the defendants did not use the
words as trademarks and because Playboy produced no evidence that
the use of the words caused "any severance of the association between
plaintiff and its marks."' 92 The court also rejected the tarnishment
claim, even though the ads activated by the keywords were for content
even more sexually explicit than Playboy's content, 93 because Playboy

Engines
for
Deceptive
Ads,
at http://www.commercialalert.org/releases/
searchenginerel.html (July 16, 2001).
187. See Danny Sullivan, Lawsuit Over Paid Placements to Define Search Engines,
The Search Engine Report, at http://www.searchenginewatch.com/sereport/02/02bodysolutions.html (Feb. 19, 2002) (detailing the trademark infringement suit by
Mark Nutritionals against Altavista, FindWhat, Kanoodle, and Overture for selling
paid placement listings that appear when searches are conducted for BODY
SOLUTIONS, which the plaintiff initiated when it discovered that its site did not
appear on first page of search results for BODY SOLUTIONS).
188. Letter of Federal Trade Commission to Gary Ruskin, Executive Director,
Commercial Alert 5 (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/
staff/commercialalertletter.htm. In response to this warning, most search engines
have begun including language that indicates that paid search results are "sponsored"
or "featured." See Stefanie Olsen, Search Sites Work to Clean Up their Act, CNET
News, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-954171.html (Aug. 19, 2002); see also Brian
Krebs, FTC Warns Search Engines on Ad Placements, Washington Post, July 1, 2002,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A97072002Jull?language=
printer.
189. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
191. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1075-76 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
192. Id. at 1075.
193. See id. at 1075-76.
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failed to show any tarnishment in that Playboy's trademarks "are
associated with other
purveyors of adult entertainment in other
' 94
marketing channels."'
To establish dilution, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the mark is
famous; (2) defendant has made a commercial use of the mark in
commerce; (3) defendant's use began after the mark became famous;
and (4) defendant's use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by
diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods
and services. 95 Given that the trademark has been sold for the
purpose of triggering the defendant's banner advertisement, a plaintiff
is likely to have little trouble in most cases meeting the "famousness"
requirement and the condition that the defendant began using the
mark after it became famous.' 96
Proving blurring, on the other hand, is problematic. Blurring could
arguably arise if, for example, a search for FUJI camera film using
"Fuji" as a search term triggered a banner ad for "Fuji Soup."
However, if the banner advertising itself does not incorporate or
display the trademark, the capacity of the mark to identify and
distinguish goods is unaffected. In addition, the banner ads do not
interfere with the search results, and the link to the trademark
owner's website can still be located on the search results page.
Keyword banner advertising does not lessen the quality of the search.
Only if the advertising became so invasive as to intrude upon or
interfere with the search results would the argument for dilution
become relevant. This type of search engine is very unlikely to be
successful for long, since users will question its reliability and
objectivity. At this point, the distinction between keyword banner
advertising and metatagging becomes clear. If the search results are
inundated with websites using the trademark in their metatags, the list
of search results may be so long that the user will abandon his or her
attempt to find the trademark owner's website 97 "Further, because
users will not associate the banner ad and the competitor's product [or
service] with the trademark,
the trademark retains its capacity to serve
' 98
identifier."'
unique
a
as
A trademark owner might also argue that he or she is prevented
from advertising on the search engine website using his or her own
mark as a keyword because the mark has already been sold to a
competitor. The inability to use one's own mark for advertising could

194. Id. at 1076.
195. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
196. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
197. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liability for Metatagging,33 Gonz. L. Rev. 277, 300 (1997).
198. See Gregory Shea, Note, Trademarks and Keyword Banner Advertising, 75 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 529, 556 (2002).
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arguably lessen the capacity of the mark to distinguish goods or
services. However, this concern is negligible because some search
engines give priority to the trademark owner in selling the mark as a
keyword, or the trademark owner can simply outbid the competitor
for the keyword. Likewise, the trademark owner's website will appear
in the search results. This reduces any dilution effect and allows the
user to find the trademark owner's website among the results.199
As to whether a claim for dilution by tarnishment might arise where
a trademark is triggered to a banner ad that can be considered
offensive or that debases the trademark, the trademark owner might
argue, as Playboy did, that if the ads triggered are for sexually-explicit
content or are otherwise offensive, the mark's positive associations
have been harmed. This could have been argued in the J.K. Harris
case as well. A trademark owner who does not offer offensive
material may be able to succeed on this argument, but the crucial issue
here would be proof that the consumer associates the entry of a
particular trademark as a search engine keyword with the triggering of
the offensive banner advertisement. Where the trademark owner's
product or service itself is sexually-explicit or has some prurient
aspect, it is possible that competing adult content websites may find it
useful to purchase such keywords for their banner advertising;
however, the court in Playboy v. Netscape ruled against Playboy on
this issue since Playboy's trademarks were already associated with
sexually-explicit and prurient content.2?"
In sum, trademark owners are unlikely to be successful in arguing
dilution as a means of redress. Blurring is unlikely since banner ads
do not interfere with search results, and users will not associate the
advertising with the plaintiff's trademark. Furthermore, except in
limited circumstances, tarnishment is unlikely to be a convincing basis
for advocating dilution. As such, dilution is not a viable approach for
preventing the use of trademarks in keyword banner advertising.
C. Nominative Fair Use and the Comparisonto Comparative
Advertising
As with other Internet-based activities and practices, keyword
banner advertising does not square neatly with established approaches
to analyzing potential trademark violations. One of the core purposes
underlying trademark law is the prevention of free riding2"' by
competitors on the goodwill and reputation of another.20 2 At the same
time, trademark law is mindful of the need of competitors to compete
199. See id.
200. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1076 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
201. "Free-riding is the diversion of value from a business rival's efforts without
payment." Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992).
202. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270-85.
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freely in the market. A firm has the right to compete as long as it
avoids marketing deceptively," 3 infringing another's trademarks, or
appropriating another's trade values.20 4 Sometimes, however, these
competing policies are at odds, and one must give way to the other.
Along these lines, the Welles case reminds us that nominative fair
use, which occurs when another's mark is used to discuss the
trademark or trademark owner itself,2" 5 remains relevant to online
conduct placed under the lens of trademark law. Such a use arises out
of necessity, when the product or service is not readily identifiable
without use of or reference to the mark, the user makes use of the
mark only to the extent necessary, and the use or reference does
nothing to suggest support, sponsorship, or endorsement by the
trademark owner." 6 Nominative fair use protects a seller who knows
that a consumer might be interested in a competing product and who
targets that consumer to encourage brand-switching." 7 If the seller
references a competitor's mark in the process of drawing comparisons
between its own and the competitor's products or services, then
nominative fair use will privilege this as comparative advertising." 8
Likewise, comparative advertising benefits both the consumer and the
seller by promoting competition among firms and decreasing
consumer search costs.2" 9 Comparative advertising is "advertising that
compares alternative brands on objectively measurable attributes or
price, and identifies the alternative brand by name, illustration or
other distinctive information."2 " Such advertising is permissible as an
informational use of another's mark, as long as consumers are not
confused as to source in the process.2"
Moreover, comparative
advertising is not actionable as a basis for a dilution claim. 2
203. Section 43(a) prohibits false advertising in the form of "false or misleading
description of fact." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
204. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 1 (1995).
205. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992); WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991); Calvin
Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1987).
207. See supra note 95.
208. See Michael G. Frey, Comment, Is It Fair to Confuse? An Examination of
Trademark Protection, The Fair Use Defense, and the First Amendment, 65 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1255, 1264-68 (1997).
209. See Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Prestonettes,
Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924), in which the Supreme Court advised,
A trade mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect
the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his .... When
the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such
sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is not
taboo.
Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
210. FTC Statement of Policy Regarding Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §
14.15 n.1 (1980).
211. See McCarthy, supra note 22 § 24.97.1, at 24-201-02; see also McNeil-P.P.C.,
Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991); Charles of the Ritz
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Keyword banner ads triggered by trademarks as search terms
should be considered a privileged form of comparative advertising
when they allow a firm to offer an alternative product or service in
competition with that of a competitor. The purchase of a keyword
that matches the competitor's trademark is a minimalist use of the
mark that enhances consumer choice by providing the consumer with
information about additional options." 3
Similarly, by allowing
keywords to trigger nonconfusing and nondeceptive advertising, the
consumer is the ultimate beneficiary even though the banner ads that
are keyed by the trademarks entered as search terms appear in close
proximity on the same page as the search result listings.2 14 When
competition is encouraged in this way, the consumer can make a more
informed choice from a wider array of competing products and
services.
It is useful to recall the metaphor employed by the court in Playboy
v. Netscape: "[A] driver pull[s] off the freeway in response to a sign
that reads 'Fast Food Burgers' ... [and] find[s] a well-known fast food
burger restaurant, next to which stands a billboard that reads: 'Better
Burgers: 1 Block Further."'21 5 Mindful of the limitations of any
metaphor,"' we can likewise conceptualize keyword banner
advertising to the common practice of placing a store's own generic
products next to branded products on the same shelf, or to one firm
buying advertising space on the same page of a telephone yellow
pages or theater program on which a competitor's advertisement
appears. Many grocery stores use consumer purchases to trigger
electronic coupons for competing brands at their checkout counters. 17
A store clerk who is asked by a consumer for the location of one
brand may be told that a competing brand is currently on sale.
Amazon.com and Barnesandnoble.com routinely customize the
results of consumers requests for books by displaying lists of other
suggested books similar to the titles searched.
In each of these instances, consumers may be attracted by the
prospect of a better bargain to explore other available alternatives.
Group v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1987).
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (2000).
213. See Kaminer, supra note 156, at 59.
214. See Rajzer, supra note 181, at 463 ("Consumers are better served when similar
products are placed in proximity so they can make the most informed decision
possible.").
215. Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1075 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
216. "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244
N.Y. 84, 94 (1926). Nevertheless, "[m]etaphor is a central modality of human thought
without which we cannot even begin to understand the complex regularities of the
products of the human mind." Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life,
and Mind 43 (2001).
217. See Kaminer, supra note 156, at 59-60.
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Similarly, if consumers choose to click on a banner ad and visit a
competitor's website, they are doing so not because they are
perplexed, but because they are enticed by the availability of another
option. Aside from the lack of consumer confusion, keyword banner
advertising allows competitors to build brand awareness and to make
a few more sales by triggering their ads to trademarked search terms.
Trademark law, which has as one of its goals the protection of
consumers and the promotion of fair competition,2 18 should not be
deployed to restrict information available to consumers when they
conduct searches or to disallow consumers from making the most
informed decisions when shopping online.
CONCLUSION

Aside from recent concerns surrounding search engine results,219
trade in keyword searches is becoming a staple of online business
models.22
Even so, trademark law challenges to keyword banner
advertising continue to arise.22 ' Whether it is manipulative or
ingenious, however, most types of keyword banner advertising do not
amount to trademark infringement or dilution.222 The practice is
neither legally abusive to competitors and consumers, nor a threat to
218. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 Yale L. J. 1717, 1728-31 (1999); see also Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J.
1165 (1948).
219. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues arising from technical attempts to
promote higher search engine result rankings, see James A. Rossi, Protection for
Trademark Owners: The Ultimate System of Regulating Search Engine Results, 42
Santa Clara L. Rev. 295 (2002).
220. See John Borland, Paid Content Comes to Kazaa, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.com/2102-1023-917348.html (discussing how Kazaa, a popular peerto-peer file-swapping network, will feature songs for sale by record labels and
advertisements linked to keyword searches).
221. E.g., Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., No. C-02-1253 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 13,
2002). The plaintiff in this case has alleged that the defendant purchased its
registered NETBULA and POWER RPC trademarks as keywords on the Google
search engine and is using those marks in its website metatags. Specifically, Netbula
argues that this conduct constitutes trademark infringement, false advertising, and
interference with prospective economic advantage. See id.
222. A business ethics assessment of whether keyword banner advertising should
be interpreted as unauthorized exploitation of a competitor's goodwill might begin
with reference to article 10 of the International Chamber of Commerce International
Code of Advertising Practice, which states,
Advertisements should not make unjustifiable use of the name, initials, logo
and/or trademarks of another firm, company or institution nor should
advertisements in any way take undue advantage of another firm, person or
institution's goodwill in its name, trade name or other intellectual property,
nor should advertisements take advantage of the goodwill earned by other
advertising campaigns.
ICC International Code of Advertising Practice art. 10 (1997), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rules/rules/1997/advercod.asp.
An analysis
of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
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the basic foundation of trademark protection.22 3 In a time of an
increasingly expanding ambit of intellectual property rights
protection,224 such a conclusion is necessary to fend off those who
would use trademark law as another firewall against online
competition.
Confusion remains the key to proving trademark infringement in
this setting. Those who argue in favor of infringement liability
presume that consumers are unsophisticated and not Internet savvy
enough to expect that the banner advertiser is not affiliated with the
trademark owner or that consumers know that most, if not all, of the
ads are not sponsored by the trademark owner. 225 Banner ads are
usually clearly labeled so as to identify their source. Where a banner
ad is so designed as to be ambiguous or deceptive as to the true
source, there may indeed be confusion related to the trademark used
226
as a search term and therefore a basis of liability for infringement.
However, such instances may be better remedied by the laws
Keyword banner
regulating false or misleading advertising. 227
advertising does not confuse consumers as to source because
consumers expect that the ads are not commercially connected to the
trademark that they have entered as a search term in the search
engine. 228
Likewise, keyword banner advertising does not weaken or taint a
famous mark that the consumer has already selected as the object of
his or her search. Dilution by blurring is improbable because banner
ads do not interfere with the search results to the extent that
consumers will associate the advertising with the trademark. 29
Dilution by tarnishment is unlikely, except in limited circumstances
where the ads lead a consumer to associate the entry of a particular
trademark as a search engine keyword with the triggering of banner
advertising that demeans the trademark or is otherwise offensive or

223. But see Michael Wu, Comment, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp. and Excite, Inc.: The Impact of Banner Ad Keying on the
Development of E-commerce, 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 161 (2001), available at
keyword
advertisers
that
(asserting
http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/pdf/wu.pdf
"misappropriate [competitor's] goodwill through their abusive use of banner ads" and
that the "purpose behind the trademark laws is effectively undermined").
224. See Roemer, supra note 136 (remarking that the Playboy v. Netscape decision
is out of step with the current pro-intellectual property trend).
225. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (providing a remedy for false advertising against
anyone who misrepresents "the nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin
of his or her.., goods, services or commercial activities"). The plaintiff must
demonstrate that the statement is false, material, and has a tendency to deceive the
public. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982); Black
Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1980).
228. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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profane.20 Here again, such advertising may be more properly
remedied by the laws of commercial disparagement and false
advertising.23 1
To the extent that keyword banner advertising implicates a
competitor's trademark rights, the practice should be recognized and
permitted as fair use or comparative advertising. The social utility of
comparative advertising is well established:
"Comparative
advertising, when truthful and nondeceptive, is a source of important
information to consumers and assists them in making rational
purchase decisions. Comparative advertising encourages product
improvement and
innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the
2 32
marketplace."
There is a longstanding right to enter markets and compete fairly.233
The practical effect of treating trademark-triggered keyword banner
ads as infringement or dilution is costly and anticompetitive.234 Every
banner ad transaction would need to be reviewed by lawyers to
determine if the ad would infringe upon or dilute another's
trademark, even if the search term was also for a generic term such as
"apple" or "united."23' 5 Keyword banner advertising does not confuse
230. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
231. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (providing a federal unfair competition remedy
against anyone who misrepresents "the nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic
origin of ...another person's goods, services, or commercial activities"). This remedy
addresses falsehoods concerning the goods or services offered for sale by a
competitor. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Girl
Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). At common law, commercial disparagement involves proof that the
defendant made false and offending statements about the plaintiff's goods or services
that resulted in special damages. See System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev.
Corp., 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977).
232. 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (2001).
233. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 1 (1995).
234. Some commentators have suggested that if trademark owners wish to prevent
competitors from using their marks, they can purchase the right to their trademarks as
keywords, preventing others from triggering advertising with the mark. Miller &
Maharaj, supra note 8 at A34. Indeed, trademark owners may find it valuable to use
their own trademarks to trigger banner ads since they can show ads for special offers
or advertise other products also made by the same company. However, several search
engines do not even sell a trademark to anyone other than the owner of the mark.
Frauenfelder, supra note 14 (noting that Hotbot, a search engine, will not sell
keywords to companies that compete with the trademark holder). Miller & Maharaj,
supra note 8, at A34 (quoting a Yahoo spokesperson who said that they would not sell
a company's trademark to competitors because "it would be bad for business").
Some search engines even offer to sell the keyword first to the trademark owner so
that the owner may use it to display its own ads; Miller & Maharaj, supra note 8. For
example, the search engine Lycos states in its advertising policy that "[e]ach
advertiser may be given a 'first right' to its exact company name and trademarks for
keyword/phrase advertising." Lycos Network Advertising Terms and Conditions,
available at http://www.lycos.com/lycosinc.advterms.html.
235. See Cameron Graham & Ann Imes, Playboy Trademark Lawsuit FailsInternet Search Engines May Continue Current Business Model, 2000 B.C. Intell. Prop.
& Tech. F. 102501, available at http://infoeagle.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st-org/iptf/
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consumers and does not abate or denigrate famous marks; rather, it
offers them more choices based on the keywords used and this
ultimately encourages competition in the electronic marketplace.

resources/index.html (asserting that the imposition of liability would lead "to more
intrusive lawyering on the Internet"); Sullivan, supra note 187 (noting that such a
result in Playboy v. Netscape "would have put a huge burden on search engines").
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